We study the efficiency of selfish routing problems in which traffic demands are revealed online. We go beyond the common Nash equilibrium concept in which possibly all players reroute their flow and form a new equilibrium upon arrival of a new demand.
Introduction
Recent contributions in the field of algorithmic game theory provided much insight into the structure and efficiency of Nash equilibria in networks that lack a central coordination. Among others, a prominent result in this field states that the price of anarchy for a nonatomic selfish routing game, is bounded by a small constant depending on the class of feasible latency functions, see Roughgarden and Tardos [30] , Roughgarden [29] , and Correa Schulz, and Stier-Moses [11] . It is well known that this kind of games applies to the source routing concept in telecommunication networks, see Qiu, Yang, Zhang, and Shenker [25] and Friedman [19] for an engineering perspective and Roughgarden [28] and Altman, Basar, Jimenez, and Shimkin [1] for a theoretical perspective on this topic. In the source routing model, sources are responsible for selecting paths to route data to the corresponding sink.
The main focus of the research done so far regarding the source routing concept is to quantify the efficiency loss of a Nash equilibrium compared to the system optimum. Here, one assumption is crucial: if the traffic matrix changes, all sources may possibly change their routes and converge to a new equilibrium, see Even-Dar and Mansour [16] for a further discussion about the convergence behavior. This assumption, however, has some important implications: Each source would have to continuously maintain the current state of all available routes, which in turn introduces additional traffic overhead by signaling these needed informations. Furthermore, frequent rerouting attempts during data transmission may not only produce transient load oscillations as observed by Fischer and Vöcking [18] , but may also interfere with the widely used congestion control protocol tcp that determines the data rate, as reported by La, Walrand, and Anantharam in [24] . For these reasons, rerouting attempts in reaction to traffic changes in the network are not necessarily beneficial and efficient.
In this paper, we study a different model in which demands of players are released in n sequential games in an online fashion. In each game, the new demands form a Nash equilibrium, and their routing remains unchanged afterwards, that is, the routing becomes nonadaptive.
We can interpret this model as follows. Let us introduce a cost for each player quantifying the cost of rerouting after some initial time frame. Within the standard equilibrium concept, rerouting comes at no cost. On the other hand, if this rerouting cost is sufficiently large for each player, then, fixing the initial equilibrium routing is the best response strategy.
If rerouting is not allowed in general, then, the problem of finding efficient routings becomes an online optimization problem. In this regard, nonadaptive selfish routing constitutes an online algorithm, where the goal is to minimize average congestion cost for all commodities. We present two distributed online algorithms, called NSeqnash and ASeqnash for this setting. Upon release of a set of commodities (network game), the online algorithm NSeqnash routes the commodity such that the flow is at Nash equilibrium provided nonatomic agents are carrying the flow. The atomic splittable variant is given by ASeqnash.
Related Work
The fact that the cost of a Nash equilibrium may strictly exceed that of a system optimum is well known in the transportation literature, see Braess [6] and Dubey [15] . A first successful attempt to exactly quantify this so called "price of anarchy" is given by Papadimitriou and Koutsoupias [23] in the context of a load balancing game in communication networks. Roughgarden and Tardos [30] studied the price of anarchy in nonatomic selfish routing games. In nonatomic games, a large number of players is assumed, each consuming an infinitesimal part of the resources. In particular, they proved for affine latency functions a bound of 4 3 on the price of anarchy. A series of several other follow-up papers analyzed the price of anarchy for more general cost functions and model features; see for example Czumaj and Vcking [13] , Correa Schulz, and Stier-Moses [11] , and Roughgarden [28] .
For atomic routing games, that is, some players may control a significant part of the entire demand, Roughgarden and Tardos [30] examined the price of anarchy for unsplittable flow. Awerbuch, Azar, and Epstein [2] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [9] studied the price of anarchy for linear atomic congestion games. Cominetti, Correa, and Stier-Moses [10] presented new bounds on the price of anarchy for splittable atomic routing games that revised previous work of Roughgarden [29] and Correa, Schulz, and Stier-Moses [12] . Hayrapetyan, Tardos, and Wexler [22] improved these bounds for special network topologies.
In the online routing field, several papers considered online load balancing in the context of machine scheduling. Awerbuch et al. [3] considered a greedy online load balancing strategy, where the goal is to minimize the L 2 norm of the aggregated server loads. Similar to this paper, Suri et al. [31] and Caragiannis et al. [7] studied Nash solutions for every released job and showed that the resulting online algorithm outperforms the greedy strategy of [3] . These results, however, are restricted to m parallel arcs and all jobs have to be assigned to exactly one machine. In the paper by Awerbuch, Azar, and Plotkin [4] , online routing algorithms are presented to maximize throughput under the assumption that routings are irrevocable. They presented online algorithms whose competitive bounds depend on the number of nodes in the network.
Our work is motivated by the paper by Harks, Heinz, and Pfetsch [21] , where online multicommodity routing problems are considered. They considered affine latency functions and presented a greedy online algorithm for a different convex cost function that is In their framework, only single demands are released consecutively.
Our Results and Techniques
We introduce the framework Online Network Games (OnlineNG) to analyze nonadaptive selfish routing under the assumption that demands (network games) are released online. For the online algorithm NSeqnash that is characterized by selfish routing of nonatomic players for a sequence of network games, we obtain the following results. The online algorithm NSeqnash that produces a flow that is at Nash equilibrium for every game is 4n 2+n -competitive for affine latency functions, where n is the number of games within a given sequence. This result contains the bound on the price of anarchy of 4 3 for affine latency functions of Roughgarden and Tardos [30] as a special case of our result, where n = 1. We prove a lower bound of 3n−2 n of NSeqnash showing that for n = 2, the upper bound is tight. For linear latency functions, we further improve this bound to 4n 2 (1+n) 2 . For polynomial latency functions with nonnegative coefficients, we prove lower and upper bounds on the competitive ratio of NSeqnash that grow both exponentially in the degree of the considered polynomials. We further show that for parallel arcs, the competitive ratio is significantly lower. In particular, we show that in this case, the competitive ratio of the online algorithm NSeqnash does not exceed the price of anarchy of a related nonatomic network game in which all games of a given sequence are considered at the same time.
Furthermore, we consider online network games in which atomic players route their demand selfishly. Note that the atomic players may split their flow along different paths. The online algorithm ASeqnash, which produces a flow that is at Nash equilibrium for every game is min{
K+5 , 4.92}-competitive for affine latency functions Here, K denotes the total number of players and n is the number of games within a given sequence. For general polynomial latency functions, we prove lower and upper bounds on the competitive ratio of ASeqnash that grow both exponentially in the degree of the considered polynomials. Finally, we prove better bounds for the parallel arc case for ASeqnash, relating the cost of ASeqnash to the cost of a nonatomic game, generalizing a result of Hayrapetyan, Tardos, and, Wexler [22] .
To prove our main results (Theorem 1 and 2) we generalize the variational inequality approach previously used by Correa, Schulz, and Stier-Moses [11] , Roughgarden [27] , Cominetti, Correa, and Stier-Moses [10] , and Harks [20] . The techniques used to prove upper bounds for ASeqnash in the parallel arc case (Theorem 4) are based on ideas of Hayrapetyan, Tardos, and, Wexler [22] . Our extended approach incorporates the known price of anarchy results as a special case with n = 1.
Note that the online algorithms NSeqnash and ASeqnash are fully distributed, hence, no coordination mechanism is needed to implement these algorithms. Furthermore, all results for the parallel arc case directly carry over to the online load balancing problem with parallel (splittable) jobs, where the objective is to minimize the L 2 norm of the server loads. 
Online Network Games
(
This cost function reflects the routing cost provided all commodities of the entire sequence of games have been routed. Thus, the cost of routing commodities of a sequence of games is not separable with respect to the games. That is, if an online algorithm routes flow for the games i+1, . . . , n along arcs that are used by commodities of games 1, . . . , i, the latter commodities may face higher individual cost on these arcs compared to their initial routing costs.
Player Types
Motivated by the source routing model in telecommunication networks, we focus on selfish behavior of players routing the demands
In the following, we use the word commodity ij interchangeably with player ij to indicate that this player decides on the routing assignment f ij for the demand d ij . In the nonatomic routing variant, we assume infinitely many agents carrying the flow of a player, where each agent controls only an infinitesimal fraction of the flow. This is in contrast to the atomic routing variant, where it is assumed that each player ij controls and coordinates the entire flow for his demand d ij . For a sequence of games, we investigate the online algorithms NSeqnash and ASeqnash (a formal definition follows) that produce a feasible flow f 1 , . . . , f n ∈ F n , where each f i is at Nash equilibrium for the corresponding network game i.
Nash Equilibria for Nonatomic and Atomic Players
A flow for game i is at Nash equilibrium, if no player has an incentive to unilaterally change her strategy. We assume that players of game i decide on their strategies without taking future games j = i+1, . . . , n into account. It is straightforward to check that a Nash flow f i for nonatomic players minimizes the
dz, see for example Roughgarden and Tardos [30] . Furthermore, using convexity of the potential function two different Nash equilibria incur the same cost. The following conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a Nash equilibrium for game i.
Lemma 1. A feasible flow f i for the nonatomic game i is at Nash equilibrium if and only if it satisfies:
The proof is based on the first order optimality conditions and the convexity of the potential function Φ i (f ), see Dafermos and Sparrow [14] .
Definition 1 (NSeqnash for the OnlineNG). Consider an instance of the
OnlineNG with a given sequence σ of n network games. The deterministic online algorithm NSeqnash produces a feasible flow
Note that the problem of minimizing Φ k (f ) is well defined and admits an optimal solution with a unique objective value. Hence, NSeqnash is also well defined by this property. Since this convex program may have several different solutions (with the same objective value), the flow that NSeqnash produces is not necessarily unique. As this might contradict the notion of a deterministic online algorithm, we can advise a selection rule to make the flow unique. We omit this issue in the following, since our results hold for every sequence of Nash flows for the games 1, . . . , n.
In network games with atomic players, some players may control a significant part of the entire demand. In the following, we characterize the strategy of an atomic player. It is straightforward to see that a best reply strategy for player ij of game i is to minimize its individual current cost
The following conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a Nash equilibrium for game i.
Lemma 2. A feasible flow f i for the atomic game i is at Nash equilibrium if and only if for every player ij ∈ [K i ] the following inequality is satisfied:
for all feasible flows x ij for game i.
The proof relies on the convexity of a (z) z.
Definition 2 (ASeqnash for the OnlineNG). Consider an instance of the
OnlineNG with a given sequence σ of n network games. The deterministic online algorithm ASeqnash produces a feasible flow
, that is, each f i is at Nash equilibrium for the corresponding games i ∈ [n].
Since we assume convex latency functions, the minimization problem is well defined and admits an optimal solution with a unique objective value. Then, the existence of a flow at Nash equilibrium is guaranteed by the result of Rosen [26] . Hence, ASeqnash is also well defined by this property.
Finally, the total offline optimum minimizes the total cost C(f ) among all feasible flows. For a given sequence σ, we denote by Opt(σ) the optimal value of this convex problem.
Competitive Analysis
For a solution f produced by an online algorithm Alg for a given sequence of games σ, we denote by Alg(σ) = C(f ) its cost. An online algorithm Alg is called (strictly) c-competitive, if the cost of Alg is never larger than c times the cost of an optimal offline solution. The competitive ratio of Alg is the infimum over all c ≥ 1 such that Alg is c-competitive, see for instance Borodin and El-Yaniv [5] and Fiat and Woeginger [17] .
Competitive Analysis for NSeqnash
In order to derive competitive results for NSeqnash for a sequence of games, we make use of the variational inequality (2) . Using the notation ϑ
a , we define for every a ∈ A, nonnegative vectors f a , x a ∈ Ê K + , and a nonnegative real number λ ≥ 0, the following value (we assume by convention 0/0 = 0): Figure 1 illustrates the value ω( a ; n, λ) for n = 3. For a given class L of nondecreasing latency functions we further define ω(L; n, λ) := sup a ∈L ω( a ; n, λ). Furthermore, we define the following feasible set for the parameter λ. Proof. Let f be the flow generated by NSeqnash and let x be any feasible flow for a given sequence of games σ = 1, . . . , n. Then, we obtain:
Definition 3. The feasible scaling set for λ is defined as
Here, (5) follows by applying the variational inequality in Lemma 1. The last inequality (6) follows from the definition of ω(L; n, λ) and since λ ∈ Λ(L, n). Taking x as the optimal offline solution yields the claim.
In the following we relate the value ω(L; n, λ) to the anarchy value α(L) introduced by Roughgarden in [27] , the parameter β(L) introduced by Correa, Schulz, and Stier-Moses in [11] , and the value ω(L; λ) introduced in Harks [20] .
if we have λ = 1 and n = 1. For arbitrary λ ≥ 0 and n = 1, we have ω(L, n, λ) = ω(L, λ) as defined in Harks [20] . The difference between these two values is the nonnegative value ϑ n a ( a , f a ), which accounts for the online setting. It increases for n ≥ 1 making the value ω(L, n, λ) larger and, hence, increases the competitive ratio.
Upper Bounds for Linear Latency Functions. In the following, we bound the value ω(L; n, λ) for affine linear latency functions. We start with some useful prerequisites. For n = 1, we obtain the bound of 4 3 for nonatomic network games involving affine latency functions first proved in Roughgarden and Tardos [30] .
For purely linear latency functions we can improve the upper bound by defining λ := n n+1 below 1. Using a geometric proof as illustrated in Figure 1 the upper bound of 4 also holds for general continuous, nondecreasing, and concave latency functions.
Corollary 2. If the latency functions of the
OnlineNG are linear, the online algorithm NSeqnash is
Corollary 3. If the latency functions of the OnlineNG are concave, the online algorithm NSeqnash is 4-competitive.
Upper Bounds for Polynomial Latency Functions. Now we consider the class L d of polynomials with nonnegative coefficients and degree at most d ∈ AE:
Note that polynomials in L d are nonnegative for nonnegative arguments, nondecreasing, and convex. We can easily see that sup
Observe that the cost function C(f ) is linear in each of the latency functions a (·). Therefore, we can reduce the analysis to monomial price functions by subdividing each arc a into d arcs a 1 , . . . , a d with monomial latency functions as (x) = c s x s for every s = 1, . . . , s.
Lemma 4. For the class
n, λ) = 0 and the claim is trivially true. By definition, we have
.
Consider now the monomial price function
To bound the value ω( a ; n, λ) from above, we have to consider:
Because of the assumption λ ≥ 1 the maximum is attained at a point with μ ≤ 1. Thus, it follows that max 0≤μ μ − λ μ s+1 ≤ max 0≤μ μ − λ μ d+1 . This shows the claim.
Proposition 1. For polynomial latency functions ∈ L d and λ
Proof. The unique solution of the maximization problem in Lemma 4 is given by μ * = 
Corollary 4. Consider the OnlineNG with latency functions in L d . Then, the competitive ratio of the online algorithm NSeqnash is at most
Proof. Let the flow f be produced by the online algorithm NSeqnash and let x be an arbitrary feasible flow for the OnlineNG. We define λ := (d + 1)
and apply Proposition 1, which yields ω(L; n, λ) ≤
In order to apply Theorem 1, we have to verify that λ ∈ Λ(L, n). What remains to be shown is that 1 − 
Taking x as the optimal offline solution proves the claim.
Competitive Analysis for ASeqnash
In this section, we analyze the efficiency of the online algorithm ASeqnash, which produces a flow f i that is at Nash equilibrium for every game i provided that we also allow for atomic players. Recently, Cominetti, Correa, and StierMoses [10] discovered that the price of anarchy may be quite large in network games with atomic players. Based on the work of Catoni and Pallotino [8] , they presented an example, where the price of anarchy in a network game with atomic players is larger than that of the corresponding nonatomic game. As we show in this section, our upper bounds on the competitive ratio of the online algorithm ASeqnash also exceed that of NSeqnash. In the following we only present the main ideas. Complete proofs are left for the full version of this paper.
We define for every a ∈ A, for any nonnegative vectors f a ,
By assuming 0/0 = 0, we further define
For a given class L of nondecreasing latency functions and a nonnegative real number λ ≥ 0, we further define ω(L; n, K, λ) := sup a∈L ω( a , n, K; λ). We define the following feasible set for the parameter λ.
Definition 4. The feasible scaling set for λ is defined as
Λ(L, n, K) := λ ∈ Ê + | 1 − ω(L; n, K, λ) > 0 .
Theorem 2. Consider an instance of the OnlineNG involving a sequence of n games with K players and latency functions in L. Then, the competitive ratio of ASeqnash is at most
The proof proceeds along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 1 except that the value ω( a ; n, K, λ) contains derivatives , which account for the ability of atomic players to coordinate their flow .
Linear and Polynomial Latency Functions.
To facilitate the result of Theorem 2, we bound ω(L; n, K, λ) for linear latency functions. Corollary 5 gives abound that only depends on the total number of players in the sequence σ of games. This bound states that ASeqnash is asymptotically 5-competitive for online atomic network games. By choosing λ = 1.13 and applying Theorem 2 it is possible to improve the upper bound to 4.92.
In the following, we derive a bound that depends on the number of games. This bound is asymptotically 6-competitive. It provides, however, an explicit dependency on the number of games and players involved. For n = 1, we obtain a bound of 3K+1 2K+2 for atomic network games with affine latency functions; this bound has previously been established by Cominetti, Correa and StierMoses [10] . For K → ∞ we can establish a bound of 
Lower Bounds
Based on an an instance presented in Harks, Heinz, and Pfetsch [21] , we can easily show that any deterministic online algorithm for the OnlineNG has a competitive ratio greater then or equal to 4 3 even for linear latencies. In the following, we present an increased lower bound for NSeqnash. Note that all lower bounds for NSeqnash also provide lower bounds for ASeqnash since we can simulate a nonatomic player by infinitely many atomic players each controlling a negligible fraction of the demand.
Proposition 2.
In case of affine latency functions, the online algorithm NSeqnash for the OnlineNG has a competitive ratio greater than or equal to 3n−2 n , where n is the number of games.
Proof. We consider the network presented in Figure 2 with the latency functions: (si,s) (z) = 0, (t,ti) (z) = 0, (si,ti) (z) = i, i = 1, . . . , k, and (s,t) (z) = z. We consecutively release a sequence of games (1, . . . , k) , where in each game j, there is a single player type j1. The demand of player type j1 is 1 that has to be routed from s i to t i , for i = 1, . . . , k. Due to the choice of the affine terms i, NSeqnash routes for every game the corresponding demand over the arc from s to t. Then we release the (k + 1)-th game with demand d from s to t. Thus, the total cost for the sequence σ = (1, . . . , k + 1) for NSeqnash with the new cost function is given by: NSeqnash(σ) = (k + d) 2 . The optimal offline algorithm Opt routes the demands of the first k games along the direct arcs from s i to t i incurring cost of:
. The last demand in game k + 1 is routed from s to t with cost d 2 . The total cost for Opt is given by:
which proves the theorem.
Remark 1.
For n = 2, the upper bound given in Corollary 1 is tight.
Based on the same instance, except using linear latency functions, we can prove a lower bound for purely linear latency functions.
Corollary 8. For linear latency functions, the online algorithm NSeqnash for OnlineNG has a competitive ratio greater than or equal to
Corollary 9. For latency functions in L d , the online algorithm NSeqnash for OnlineNG has a competitive ratio greater than or equal to
The proof is again based on the instance in Figure 2 except that we use a monomial z d for the (s, t) arc and the constant terms i become i d . The rest of the proof then consists of technical calculations that are omitted.
The construction of the lower bounds show that the first player that routes its demand along the arc (s, t) experiences individual cost of (k +x) after routing all commodities. In the common Nash equilibrium, where all players are adaptive and reroute their demand, this player would route its demand along the direct arc incurring cost of 1. Thus, the ratio of the individual cost of a nonadaptive player and that of an adaptive player is unbounded.
Parallel Arcs
For graphs that consist of two nodes and parallel arcs, we can show that NSeqnash performs not worse than a Nash flow for the entire game sequence that is played in parallel. In other words, for a given sequence of games, we compare the cost of NSeqnash to the cost of a Nash flow of a parallel game, where all players of the entire game sequence route their demands simultaneously.
For a given instance of the OnlineNG involving a sequence of games σ, we define the parallel gameσ as a single game that contains all players of the sequence σ simultaneously.
Recall from the Wardrop condition [32] that a flow f is at Nash equilibrium if and only if the following condition is satisfied: 
Note that for nonatomic network games, Nash equilibria and Wardrop equilibria are the same. A similar condition holds for the flow that is produced by NSeqnash. 
Lemma 7. A feasible flow f for the sequence of games σ is produced by NSeqnash if and only if for all
The intuition of the above proof fails, however, for general networks with a single source and a single destination. To see this, we present an instance, where the cost of a flow f produced by NSeqnash is larger than that of the corresponding Nash flow f * for the gameσ.
Example 1. Consider the graph of Braess's paradox in Figure 3 and two games that are released consecutively. Each game has a single nonatomic player routing one unit d 1 = 1, d 2 = 1 from s to t. The path system P 1 for the first player contains P 1 = (s, a, t), P 2 = (s, a, b, t), P 3 = (s, b, t). A flow that is at Nash equilibrium for the first game routes 1 unit of flow on P 2 , having path latency
In the second game, we route 1 2 unit on P 1 and 1 2 on P 3 , both having path latency 2 (f ) = 2.5. Now 2 P2 (f ) = 3. Thus, the total cost is C(f ) = 1 × 2.5 + 1 × 3 = 5.5. However, for the gameσ we route 2 units of flow from s to t. Then, a flow f * at Nash equilibrium routes one unit along paths P 1 and P 3 . The path latencies are P1 (f ) = P2 (f ) = 2, thus the total cost is C(f * ) = 2 × 2 = 4.
In the following, we investigate the parallel arc setting for ASeqnash. For the atomic case in a parallel arc network, Hayrapetyan, Tardos and, Wexler [22] have proved a similar result. Assume we have a single game with an arbitrary number of atomic players, and x a (x) is a convex function for all edges a. Then, the equilibrium cost is at most as much as the cost of the nonatomic Nash equilibrium of the total demand. Now we generalize this result for the OnlineNG.
We will compare a sequence of games with an arbitrary number of atomic players with a single game, where nonatomic players routes the flow g such that the total demand of the entire sequence is satisfied. Instead of comparing the usual costs, our result involves another cost function C 2 (f ):
C 2 (f ) means that players in game i have to pay only after their current latency in game i, and no cost according to the games i + 1, . . . , n. Note that the relation C 2 (f ) ≤ C(f ) holds because of the monotonicity of a . In the following, we will show that C 2 (f ) ≤ C(g). Then, by defining δ := sup f (C(f )/C 2 (f )), we are still able to bound the usual cost: For n = 1, this gives Theorem 2.3 in [22] . To prove the theorem, we introduce 
Before proving this lemma, we show how it implies Theorem 4. The proof is by induction. If n = 1, then we apply the lemma for z = 0. If n > 1, suppose we have proved the theorem for n − 1. Fix the flows of the first game, and modify the cost function a to q a (x) = a (x + f 1 a ). Consider the games 2, . . . , n − 1 with cost function q a , and let C q 2 denote the modified cost function. By definition, (f 2 , . . . , f n ) is in equilibrium for this sequence, and
Consider now the game described in the lemma. h = (f 1 , g q ) is in equilibrium, and the game m is identical to g as d 1 
On the other hand,
and this is what we wanted to prove. Before proving Lemma 8, we prove two other lemmas, which are motivated by [22] . This easily follows as player 1j wants to minimize a∈A a (h 1 a )h 1j a . Let T denote the minimum edge latency of game m in Lemma 8. We call an edge a overloaded, if a (h a ) > T and underloaded if a (h a ) ≤ T . The idea is, following [22] , that moving a small flow from an overloaded edge to an underloaded increases the cost. Proof. Let T 2 denote the minimum edge latency in the Nash equilibrium of h 2 . We show that T 2 ≤ T . Assume by contradiction that T 2 > T . Then by moving flows from edges with latency higher than T 2 to edges of lower latency, we can finally arrive in a Nash-equilibrium of edge latency at least T 2 , contradicting the fact that the edge latency is the same in any two different Nash-equilibria, see Roughgarden [28] . As a is overloaded andâ is underloaded, we have a (h
Lemma 10. Assume a is overloaded andâ is underloaded with
). This in turn implies (14) . Now we are ready to prove Lemma 8. We modify h by moving flow amounts from overloaded to underloaded links. We avoid creating new overloaded links: we increase the flow on the underloaded edgeâ so that â (hâ) should not exceed T . Applying such a modification maintains h 2 a = 0 on any overloaded edge a. Observe that (14) holds not only for h, but for anyh satisfyingh This ensures that we can always go on by moving flow from overloaded to underloaded links, as far as some modifications are applicable. Suppose no more modifications can be applied. In this case for each edge a, a (h a ) ≥ T . If a (h a ) = T for all edges, then Lemma 8 follows. Otherwise we have some edge a with a (h a ) > T , and for all edgesâ with â (hâ) = T , increasing hâ by an arbitrary small positive amount would result in â (h) > T . But this is a contradiction, as now the flows can be rerouted to obtain a Nash-equilibrium with edge latency strictly larger than T . Again we use that the edge latency is the same in any two different Nash-equilibria, and T was the latency of the equilibrium state m.
